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Hume: moral judgments are not straightforward expressions of belief; they're not claims about facts. Instead, they're conative responses. We're gilding & staining drab reality with colors of sentiment. Objection: when I see Ogged wronged, I sob; when I see Wolfson wronged, I laugh, yet I judge each action to be impermissible. Judgments of wrongness are therefore independent of sentiment. Hume: right. Moral judgments are (actual or counterfactual) responses from coming out the general point of view, not the perspective you coming out normally occupy as an interested observer. It's an idealized position of some coming out sort that allows for the requisite uniformity. Rachel Cohon, in SEP: Hume claims that people do not make their moral judgments from their own individual points of view, but instead select “some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them” (T 3.3.1.30).
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